Four years after Furman, the Court suggested that the concerns it expressed in that case could be met by giving the sentencing authority "adequate information and guidance." 9 The goal of this guidance, the Court explained, is to focus the attention of the sentencing authority on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant.' 0 The Court indicated that, with the exception of prejudicial evidence, the sentencer should have before it as much information as possible when making the sentencing decision." Under the sentencing procedures approved by the Court in Gregg v. Georgia, the sentencer must find at least one statutory aggravating circumstance' 2 in order for the defendant to be eligible for the death penalty.' 3 Once such eligibility is established, however, the sentencer is free to consider any factor it deems relevant in deciding which of the defendants eligible for capital punishment will actually be sentenced to death.' 4 Thus, the sentencer's discretion after Gregg remained as "unbridled" as the discretion that the Court condemned in Furman. All the Georgia legislature had done to correct its sentencing procedure was to narrow somewhat the class of individuals on whom the death penalty could be imposed.' 5 It is (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), the Court "has... surely not cloven to a principled doctrine either holding the infliction of the death penalty to be unconstitutional per se or clearly and understandably stating the terms under which the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments permit the death penalty to be imposed .... [It] has gone from pillar to post, with the result that the sort of reasonable predictability upon which legislatures, trial courts, and appellate courts must of necessity rely has been all but completely sacrificed."
9 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976 13 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 165 n.9.
14 Id.
15
The constitutionality of the Georgia sentencing procedure as a whole was reaffirmed by the Court in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980), and again in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) . In Stephens, the Court conceded that it had approved the sentencing procedure in Gregg, "even though it clearly did not channel the jury's discretion by enunciating specific standards to guide the jury's consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances." Id. at 875. This apparent inconsistency with the principles enunciated in Furman was sharply criticized by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinion in Stephens. Id. at 910-11 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
A sentencing scheme similar to Georgia's was approved in California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008 (1983) ("Once the jury finds that the defendant falls within the legislatively defined category of persons eligible for the death penalty ... [it] then is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether or not death is the appropriate punishment.").
1052
[Vol. 76 
DEATH PENALTY REVIEWERS
therefore not clear how a reviewing court may discern a "meaningful basis for distinguishing"' 16 between cases in which the death penalty has and has not been imposed.
The Court again failed to formulate a means of distinguishing death penalty cases from non-death penalty cases in Woodson v. North Carolina. 17 The Woodson Court acknowledged that Furman required courts to use "objective standards to guide [and] regularize ... the process for imposing a sentence of death."' 8 Yet, the Court also wrote that "particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character and record of each convicted defendant" is constitutionally required in the sentencing procedure. 19 It is difficult to reconcile Furman's call for objective standards to assure consistency in capital sentencing with Woodson's mandate for a broad, subjective, individualized inquiry.
20
Two years later, in Lockett v. Ohio, 2 1 the Court moved even further away from Furman, by establishing as a constitutional principle that a sentencer must be allowed to consider as a mitigating factor "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." ' 950 (1983) , the Court noted the desirability of allowing the sentencer to bring its own personal experiences to bear in making its decision. (The trial judge in Barclay had referred to his experiences with World War II concentration camps as helpful in assessing the magnitude of the crime at issue. Id. at 948 n.6.) In fact, the Court explicitly approved of sentencers exercising discretion "in their own way," although it added that such discretion must be guided in "a constitutionally adequate way." Id. at 950. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 897 (1983) (allowed testimony from psychiatrists who, though they had not examined defendant, testified, based on hypothetical questions, as to defendant's future dangerousness), the Court declared that "the jury should be presented with all of the relevant information." See also id. at
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In his concurring opinion in Lockett, Justice Marshall described the dilemma with which the Court has struggled since Furman as " [a] chieving the proper balance between clear guidelines that assure relative equality of treatment, and discretion to consider individual factors whose weight cannot always be preassigned. ' 23 Although Justice Marshall admitted that this is "no easy task," he went on to write that "[w]here life itself ... hangs in the balance, a fine precision in the process must be insisted upon."
Although the members of the Court have not agreed as to the scope of discretion to be afforded the jury in capital cases, it is clear that all agree that, in general, the goal is to avoid the imposition of the death penalty in an "arbitrary and capricious manner." 25 Perfection in capital sentencing procedures may be unobtainable, 26 but the Court wants "to insure that every safeguard is observed."
27
Because there is a difference between death and other forms of punishment, the Court has stressed the "need for reliability" in capital sentencing procedures. 28 The Court invoked this need for reliability 
. ").
This trend toward subjectivity, however, is not without its critics. Justice Rehnquist, despite the comment in Stephens quoted above, predicted in his opinion in Lockett that consideration of unlimited mitigating factors "will not eliminate arbitrariness or freakishness in the imposition of sentences, but will codify and institutionalize it. [Such consideration] will not guide sentencing discretion but will totally unleash it." 438 U.S. at 631 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall expressed similar concerns in Barclay about the failure to limit the aggravating circumstances which may be considered. 463 U.S. at 986 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("fairness and consistency cannot be achieved if nonstatutory aggravating circumstances are randomly introduced into the balance."). Moreover, several empirical studies suggest that the concerns ofJustices Rehnquist and Marshall are well-founded. ) (decision to impose death must be, and appear to be, "based on reason rather than caprice or emotion"), Eddings, 455 U.S. at 117-18 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("this Court has gone to extraordinary measures to ensure that the prisoner sentenced to be executed is afforded the process that will guarantee, as much as is humanly possible, that the sentence was not imposed out of whim, passion, prejudice or mistake"), and Stephens, 462 U.S. at 885 ("although not every imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set aside a state-court [Vol. 76 1054
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in vacating a death penalty that had been imposed, in part, on the basis of a confidential presentencing report. 2 9 The Court also vacated a death sentence imposed on the basis of unconstitutionally vague statutory aggravating circumstances. 3 0 Thus, it appears that the Court will tolerate little risk that a death sentence was imposed by a court in "an arbitrary and capricious manner." Accordingly, all but the most harmless procedural errors justify the Court in vacating the sentence. In Zant v. Stephens, for example, one of the statutory aggravating circumstances on which the jury was instructed was later invalidated by the state supreme court. 3 1 The jury, however, found two separate aggravating circumstances, and the jury could legitimately have considered evidence of the invalidated factor as a nonstatutory factor. 3 2 The Court thus found the error to be inconsequential. 
II. THE FACTS OF CALDWELL V MISSISSIPPI
Bobby Caldwell was convicted of murder and sentenced to death for shooting and killing the owner of a small grocery store while robbing it.3 4 Caldwell's lawyers asked the jury to show mercy, presenting as mitigating evidence character references, and evijudgment, the severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of error.").
29 Gardner, 430 U.S. at 364 (White, J., concurring). 30 Godfrey, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (statute allowed jury to find, as an aggravating circumstance, that the offense was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman"). In Stephens, the Court noted that "an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder." 462 U.S. at 877. 31 Stephens, 462 U.S. at 864. , J., dissenting) . Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), provides another example of the risk of unreliability the Court is willing to take in capital sentencing procedures. In Barefoot, the Court held that the requirement that a court of appeals issue a stay of execution if it is unable to resolve the merits of an appeal prior to the scheduled execution date does not prevent the courts from adopting "appropriate summary procedures." Id. at 888-89. Here again, the risk of unreliability actually assumed by the Court was quite low, as the defendant had been afforded an opportunity to address the underlying merits of his appeal, albeit at a proceeding that combined consideration of the appeal with that of the application for a stay. See id. at 889-90. Nonetheless, in Barefoot, four of the justices deemed the risk unacceptable. See id at 906 (Stevens, J., concurring) (court of appeals made serious procedural error); id. at 913 (Marshall, J, dissenting) ("there is absolutely no justification for providing fewer procedural protections solely because a man's life is at stake."); id. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 34 Caldwell, 105 S. Ct. 2633 Ct. , 2637 Ct. (1985 .
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1055 SUPREME COURT REVIEW dence of Caldwell's youth, family background and poverty. 3 5 They attempted to impress upon the jury the gravity of its decision, suggesting that Caldwell's life rested in its hands.
6
The prosecutor, in response, characterized the defense's approach as unfair, stating, "they would have you believe that you're going to kill this man and.., they know that your decision is not the final decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is reviewable." Over objection by defense counsel, the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to continue, noting, "I think it proper that the jury realizes that it is reviewable automatically as the death penalty commands. I think that information is now needed by the Jury so they will not be confused." 3 8
The prosecutor then proceeded to complain that the defense had insinuated "that your [the jury's] decision is the final decision 39 Id. 40 The comments of the prosecutor regarding the jury's role are omitted from the opinion ofJustice Marshall, writing for the majority, but are supplied by Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion. This omission helped the majority characterize the prosecutor's remarks as having led the jury to believe "that responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rests not with [it] but with the appellate court ...... Id. at 2636. See also id. at 2648-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (Justice Rehnquist accuses the majority of supplying its own "sweeping" characterization of the prosecutor's remarks at several points in its opinion). As will be seen, the additional facts supplied by Justice Rehnquist cast some doubt upon the accuracy of the majority's characterization. [Vol. 76 1056
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Caldwell argued that the prosecutor's statements, in minimizing the jury's sense of responsibility, violated the eighth amendment's requirement of reliability in capital sentencing proceedings. 43 An equally divided Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed Caldwell's death sentence. 44 
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN CALDWELL
After disposing of a jurisdictional argument advanced by the state, 4 5 the Court in Caldwell found that the prosecutor's argument undermined the "need for reliability" established by Woodson.
6
The Court also cited its historical recognition that death penalty cases require a "greater degree of scrutiny" 4 7 than non-capital cases. The Court further noted that its decision in Caldwell was not the first case in which it imposed limits on the imposition of capital punishment out of "concern that the sentencing process should facilitate the responsible and reliable exercise of sentencing discretion." 48 The Court identified three specific reasons why it feared substantial unreliability and bias could exist in cases such as Caldwell's. First, it suggested that appellate review is an inadequate safeguard. The Court reasoned that appellate courts are "wholly ill-suited to evaluate the appropriateness of death in the first instance" as such courts are able to consider few of the intangibles which a jury could take into account in its sentencing deliberations. 49 The Court con- Caldwell, 443 So.2d at 813. The court suggested that "[bly the same reasoning, states may decide whether it is error to mention to jurors the matter of appellate review ....
Id. The court concluded that no error had occurred at Caldwell's trial because (1) the prosecutor's remarks were justified in response to defense counsel's pleas for mercy and his false suggestion that a sentence of life imprisonment would leave the defendant behind bars for the rest of his life, (2) the comments of the prosecutor and the trial judge regarding appellate review were both "truthful and accurate" And (3) the jury's finding of four aggravating circumstances with insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh them was supported by the evidence. Id. at 814.
45 The state contended that the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court rested on adequate and independent state grounds: specifically, that Caldwell had not initially assigned as error the prosecutor's argument. 49 Id. at 2640. The Court expressed particular concern about an appellate court's "inability to confront and examine the individuality of the defendant," rendering it diffi-1057 1985] SUPREME COURT REVIEW cluded that "[g]iven these limits, most appellate courts review sentencing determinations with a presumption of correctness." 50 Second, the Court reasoned that an "intolerable danger" existed that a jury might wish merely to "send a message of extreme disapproval for the defendant's acts," confident that the death sentence, if appropriate, would be vacated on appeal. 51 Thus, the Court noted, "[a] defendant might . . .be executed, although no sentencer had ever made a determination that death was the appropriate sentence." 5 2
Finally, the Court suggested that given the difficulty of making a capital sentencing decision, the jury would be unduly tempted to delegate its responsibility, and thus vote for death because a death sentence is automatically reviewable. 5 3 The Court noted that such a delegation also could lead to the execution of a defendant without a determination as to the appropriateness of the death sentence. 54 In finding an undue bias in favor of death as a result of the prosecutor's arguments, the Court further noted that its conclusions had the support of most of the state courts that had confronted similar cases. 55 The state argued that the Court's decision in California v. Ramos 56 stood for the proposition that "each state may decide for itself the extent to which a capital sentencing jury should know of postsentencing proceedings."-5 7
The Court characterized the state's reading of Ramos as "too broad," and went on to distinguish Ramos, reasoning that the information presented to the jury by the court in that case was both accurate and relevant. 58 In the instant case, by contrast, the Court found that the prosecutor's argument was misleading as to the nature of appellate review and irrelevant to the cult for such a court to consider the "compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind. 60 in which it had upheld a death sentence despite certain improper remarks that had been made by the prosecutor. The Court noted that the trial judge in Donnelly had found the prosecutor's remarks to be improper and had given the jury a strong curative instruction. 6 1 In Caldwell, the Court pointed out, the trial judge not only failed to give such a curative instruction, but openly agreed with the prosecutor's remarks. 6 2 Moreover, the Donnelly Court had characterized the remarks of the prosecutor as "ambiguous," whereas the remarks at issue in Caldwell were, in the Court's view, "quite focused, unambiguous and strong." 63 Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurring opinion to emphasize that, in her view, Ramos would not preclude "the giving of nonmisleading and accurate information regarding the jury's role in the sentencing scheme ... ,"64 She noted that a state may reasonably conclude that the reliability of its sentencing procedure would be enhanced by providing such information, as jurors may harbor misconceptions regarding the nature of review undertaken by appellate courts. 6 5 Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent in which he was joined by Chief Justice Burger andJustice White, showed a greater tolerance for the risk of unreliability. Rehnquist wrote that "the Eighth Amendment is satisfied where the procedures ensure that the sentencer's discretion is 'suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.' "66 He went on to dispute the majority's characterization of the facts, arguing that the prosecutor had not told the jury they were not responsible, but rather had emphasized the jury's role. 6 7 Justice Rehnquist further contended that, viewed in their entirety, the prosecutor's remarks had not mischaracterized the nature of appellate review. 68 
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to the attention focused upon them in the charge, the impassioned plea for mercy from Caldwell's counsel, Caldwell, and Caldwell's mother, as well as the prosecutor's rebuttal. 69 Justice Rehnquist concluded with an interpretation of Ramos substantially the same as that of Justice O'Connor. He suggested that the eighth amendment does not prohibit the provision to a capital sentencing jury of accurate information regarding appellate review. 7 0 He wrote that "there is no constitutional requirement that all information received by a sentencing jury be relevant." 7 '
IV. ANALYSIS Given the need for reliability in capital sentencing procedures, a death penalty imposed by a jury that had been led to believe that ultimate sentencing responsibility belonged to someone else would be properly vacated by the Court. It is questionable, however, whether the prosecutor in Caldwell had led the jury to believe that it did not have the ultimate responsibility for sentencing.
In Cupp v. Naughten, the Court wrote that "a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be reviewed in the context of the overall charge."' 7 2 The Court recognized that not only is a jury instruction "but one of many such instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of several components of the trial . . . . " 73 As a prosecutor's argument is "billed in advance ... as a matter of opinion[,] not of evidence," 74 this same reasoning would appear to apply at least equally well to a single remark made by a prosecutor. It is therefore not clear that the reference by the prosecutor in Caldwell to appellate review created a significant risk that the jury's sense of its responsibility was diminished." 7 5 Whatever risk may otherwise have existed was reduced by the prosecutor's subsequent emphasis on the importance of the jury in the Mississippi capital sentencing system. 76 Nonetheless, the Court's past insistence that every safeguard be observed 7 7 to insure reliability in capital sentencing, 78 as well as its
